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Chapter7
Special Tax Zones and the World Trade Organization
Reuven Avi-Yonah* and Martin Vallespinos**

7.1. Tax competition and special tax zones
A special tax zone (STZ) is a preferential tax regime that is ring-fenced. A
preferential tax regime is ring-fenced when the sponsoring country effectively protects its domestic economy from the harmful effects of its own
tax breaks. 1 The protection of the domestic economy is generally achieved
either by excluding the resident taxpayers from taking advantage of the tax
benefits or by prohibiting the beneficiaries from operating in the domestic
markct. 2

The gist of this practice was well-explained by the OECD in the consolidated application note of the 1998 report, "Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue"' (the 1998 Report), as follows:
Countries may reduce effective tax rates on the income from geographically
mobile activities to attract new investment, stimulate particular types of business activity, or maintain existing domestic activity. The hope is that the tax
revenue foregone will be compensated by an increase in the desired activity.
Despite these objectives, a reduction of the effective tax rate may result in a net
revenue loss. Continued reductions of the effective tax rate are even more likely
to result in less revenue for the government
If, however, a country partly or fully ring fences the application of a low effective rate of tax, then the domestic tax base of the country providing the low
rate will not be affected. The lower tax rate applied will primarily or only have
an impact on the tax bases of foreign countries from which the geographically
mobile financial or other service activity is attracted. In this case, ring-fenced
regimes will have little or no cost to the country offering the regime and thus

*

Professor of Law and Director of the International Tax LL.M programme of the
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A. Laukkanen, Special Tax Zones in Developing Countries and Global Tax Policy,

70 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 3 (2016), Journals IBFD.
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OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD 1998).
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there is no inherent limit on their use. This may lead to a proliferation of ringfenced regimes which in tum might interfere with each country's sovereign
right to determine its own tax policy, including the decision to tax such income:~
During the last decades, and since the first modem STZ was established
in Ireland in 1959,' a variety of different rone setups have evolved. The
most typical are commonly associated with isolated areas (e.g. industrial
parks) offering tax-free treatment for goods that enter the rone, go through
a process of assembling or manufacturing and then leave the zone. The
spectrum of STZs that are currently available for investors, however, goes
a lot further than this classic perception.• Many of the current STZs are
intended to attract service and banking activities. In addition, ring-fencing
is generally achieved through methods other than a separate customs area,
such as a private ruling granting the tax benefit to a specific beneficiary or a
general exclusion of the tax residents from the sponsoring country's direct
or indirect tax benefits.
Essentially, an STZ is a type of preferential tax regime adopted for the purpose of tax competition. This form of tax competition, however, is different
than a tax haven, Tax havens traditionally focus on tax planning, financial
services, asset holding and other schemes that allow foreign enterprises
and wealthy individuals to reduce their taxes in their residence countries.'
As such, they are generally not oriented towards attracting substantial
economic activities. In stark contrast, STZs traditionally focus on direc~
indirect and customs duties tax benefits and are intended to develop the
internal economy of the sponsoring country by attracting substantial economic activities. The existence of economic substance has protected STZs
from the criticism that has typically surrounded tax havens. However, their
better reputation does not necessarily mean that STZs are totally innocuous.
The potential harmful effects of preferential tax regimes (including STZs)
and tax havens were addressed by the OECD for the first time in 1998

4.
OECD, The OECD Project on Harmful Tax Practias, Consolidated Application
Nau: Guidance in Applying the 1998 Report to Prefuential Tax Regimes p. 20 (OECD
1998),
.5.
M. Engman, 0. Onodera & E. Pinali, Export Proassing Zones: Past and Future
Rok in Trade and Development, OECD Trade Policy, Working Paper No. 53 (OECD
2007), available at http://www,oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?
doclanguaiic=en&cotea-td/tc/wp{2006)39/final (accessed 27 Dec. 2017).
6.
J. Farrell, The /nurfaa of lniemationai Tnuk law and Taxation: Defoung t~
Role ofw IITO (IBFD 2013), Online Books IBFD.
7.
R. Palan, R. Murphy & C. Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How Globalization Really
Work< (Cornell U. Press 2010).
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with the issuance of the I 998 Report.', This report provided an analysis
of the phenomenon of harmful tax competition and identified factors that
characterize tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes. It a1so recommended numerous measures in the areas of domestic legislation, tax treaties
and international cooperation that countries may pursue to counter harmful
tax competition.Although not legally binding, the recommendations of the
1998 Report were the first attempt to set out international rules regarding
preferential tax regimes (including STZs) and tax havens.
The 1998 Report identified two types of harmful tax competition: tax havens
and harmful preferential tax regimes. Rather than a theoretical definition,
the report provided a number of key factors to identify a tax haven or a
harmful preferential tax regime. The key factors to identify a tax haven are
(i) a low or no effective tax rate; (ii) no substantial activity; (iii) a lack of
transparency; and (iv) a lack of effective exchange of information, In tum,
the key factors to identify a harmful preferential tax regime are (i) a lowm
no effective tax rate; (ii) ring-fencing; (iii) a lack of transparency; and (1v)

a lack of effective exchange of information.
In addition to this theoretical framework, the 1998 Report proposed the creation of a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) to review and monitor
the preferential tax regimes that existed among the OECD member countries. It also recommended unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures to
counteract harmful tax competition.9
Conceptually, STZs are within the scope of the 1998 initiative: as ringfencing is one of the key factors that should be considered to tdenllfy a
harmful preferential tax regime. However, the 1998 Report hrruted itself to
preferential tax regimes aimed at attracting geographically mobile activities such as financial and other service activities (e.g. msurance, leasmg
and banking). This means that STZs intended to attract active investment
in plant or manufacturing were excluded from the scope of the OECD antiharmful tax competition initiative. 10
The 1998 Report was followed by a progress report in June 2000 entitled "Towards Global Tax Co-Operation: Progress in Identifying and
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices" (the 2000 Report), which summarizes
the main findings of the FlITP. The 2000 Report identified 47 potentially

8.

OECD, supra n. 2. at p. 19.

9.
10.

Id.
Id.
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harmful preferential tax regimes, which were grouped into the following

nine categories:
intellectual property (IP) regimes;
headquarters regimes;
financing and leasing regimes;
banking and insurance regimes;
distribution centre and service centre regimes;
shipping regimes;
holding company regimes;
fund management regimes; and
other miscellaneous regimes.

Tax competition and special tax zones

strategy, which shifted towards a new approach that was less focused on
tax policy intervention and more focused on ensuring transparency and tax
information exchange.
Second, the 2006 Report did not mention that the 21 regimes listed as harmful in the 2000 Report were abolished as a result of pressure other than the
OECD initiative. Indeed, the legislative changes implemented among the

European countries within the period were driven mostly by the pressure
of the European Union on its Member States, which were required to align
their domestic tax systems with the principles of the EU Code of Conduct

on Business Taxation, as we11 as with the State aid rules.

Another progress report from 2006 (the 2006 Report) indicated that of the
47 preferential tax regimes identified as potentially harmful in the 2000
Report, 20 regimes had been abolished, 14 had been amended to remove
their potentially harmful features and 13 were found not to be harmful."
Only one preferential tax regime, i.e. the Luxembourg 1929 holding company regime, was considered harmful. 12

In 2013, the OECD and 020 countries adopted a 15-point Action Plan to
address base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). In BEPS Action 5, 1• the
OECD revamped its previous work on harmful tax practices and committed the FH1P to restarting its activities. In addition, BEPS Action 5 was

The 2006 Report was a self-identified stopping point for the anti-harmful
preferential tax regimes initiative. The last paragraph of the 2006 Report
indeed explained that "with the abolition or amendment of all the regimes
identified as harmful, all the primary mandates of the 1998 report were

consensus.

accomplished". This explanation, however, is misleading for two reasons.

ing areas, methods and main policy goals. BEPS Action 5 determined two
priority areas: (i) improving transparency, including compulsory spontane-

First, by 2006, the anti-harmful preferential tax regimes initiative had already
lost momentum as a result of the discontent and criticism expressed by several OECD member countries, including Luxembourg, Switzerland and the
United States. Indeed, through a brief communication signed in July 2001
by then-US Treasury Secretary O'Neill, 13 the United States withdrew support from "any efforts intended to dictate to any country what its own tax
rates or tax system should be" and reaffirmed its commitment to participate in any attempt to increase information exchange. The firm opposition
of these key OECD member countries impacted the Fiscal Committee's

ous information exchange on rulings related to preferentia1 regimes; and

included as one of the four BEPS minimum standards, which means that.
although not legally binding, there is a high expectation that the proposed
standards will be implemented accordingly by countries that are part of the

BEPS Action 5 introduced a renewed version of the anti-harmful tax prac-

tices initiative, thus reflecting a new approach in terms of priorities, press-

(ii) requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime. The second
priority area, however, is mainly focused on IP preferential tax regimes. In
addition, under the renovated initiative, ring-fencing remained a "factor''
for identifying a preferential harmful tax regime, but is no longer one of the

"key factors". 15 Substance, conversely, was elevated in rank from a secondary factor to a key factor. 16
After the publication of BEPS Action 5, the FHTP reviewed 164 prefer-

ential regimes. 1be results of such review are summarized in the 2017
11. OECD, TheOECD'.! Project on Hamiful Tax Pra.cticei: 2006 Updak on Progress
in Member Col8Ums pp. 5-6 (OECD 2006).
12. Tbe Luumbourg 1929 holding companies regime, howevec, was repealed on

19 April 2005. Existing 1929 holding companies wen: benefitted with a grandfathering
clause until the end of 2010. Su R. Boga,rts, uaembourg Adapts 1929 Ho/dins Compam,s
Regune to Comply with EU Code of Corufuct, 45 Eur. Taxn. 8 (2005), Journals IBFD.
13.
US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Secmary O'NeUI Staument on OECD
Tax Haveru p. I ( 10 May 2001 ), available at https://www.trcasury.gov/press-ccnter/press•
releases/Pageslpo366.aspx (accessed '1:/ Dec. 2017).

14. OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account
Troruparency and Substance-Action 5: 2015 Ftnal Reportp. 12 (OECD 2015), International
Organizations' Documentation IBFD, available at http:l/dx.doi.org/l0.178719789264241190en (accessed '1:1 Dec. 2017).
15. Id., at p. 23.
16. Id.
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OECD Progress Report on Preferential Tax Regimes (2017 Report). 17 The
2017 Report demonstrates that the OECD has kept its narrow scope in the
assessment of preferential tax regimes, as it only addresses regimes oriented towards attracting passive income and investment in financiaJ and
service activities. The categories of preferential tax regimes that remain
within the scope are similar to the nine categories identified in the 1998
Report listed above. Ring-fencing is still a relevant factor for the analysis
(e.g. the Chilean Business Platform Regime), but is no longer an essential
factor. Finally, the results of the FHTP review demonstrate that substance is
the essential factor, and tax incentives intended to develop a zone through
substantial business activities are generally respected or considered out of
scope.

In summary, the OECD anti-harmful tax practices initiative only reaches a
small portion of the STZs available around the world, namely SlZs implemented in the OECD-O20 area and focused on financial and service-related
investments. Although countries are showing progress in incorporating the
REPS minimum standards, the proposals of the OECD are not binding and
are not intended to restrict STZs oriented towards substantial manufacturing activities. Service and financial STZs, on the other hand, could raise
concerns under BEPS Action 5, but the mere presence of ring-fencing may
not be conclusive in the assessment, as this factor has been downgraded
in importance. As explained above, the main priorities in REPS Action 5
are transparency, information exchange and substance. This means that a
ring-fenced scheme that is compliant with these factors could possibly be
respected. The narrowness of the OECD approach leads to the conclusion
that the OECD does not provide a legal framework extensive enough to
regulate STZs on a global scale. The BEPS Project has ratified the OECD's
traditionally narrow approach with respect to S1Zs. This position may
reflect the OECD's intention to not involve itself in matters that would fall
under the jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as will be
explained later.

17. OECD, Harmful Tax Practices-2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes:
Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 5, (OECD 2017), available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264283954-en (accessed 27 Dec. 2017).

132

7.2. The WTO rules and STZs
7 .2.1. Overview of the WTO regime
The WTO Agreements do not include specific references to STZs. However,
this legal framework has been consistently applied to STZs to the extent that
they contravene the basic rules of the international trade system.
The WTO's legal texts are embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, which acts as an umbrella for
another 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings (collectively
known as the WTO Agreements). The WTO Agreements cover a broad
spectrum of trade issues, but overall, they are aimed at ensuring a transparent, fair and non-discriminatory international trade system. Even though the
WTO main agreement includes a broad declaration of principles, its specific
policy goals are focused on assuring fairness and non-discrimination_ in
trade and do not give significant weight to other issues, such as preventing
harmful tax competition or protecting countries' tax bases.
One of the main instruments created by the wro to achieve fairness in
trade is the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM
Agreement). This agreement provides substantive rules governing w~en
and under what circumstances a member country may challenge a subsidy
imposed by another member country. The agreement provides two avenues
for objection: a state may (i) unilaterally impose countervailing duties on
subsidized imports; or (ii) file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body with the possibility of imposing retaliatory sanctions if the
complaint is upheld. 18 One important caveat is that the SCM Agreement is
limited in scope to the area of goods and does not include rules on subsidies
in the area of services.
Article l of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as a "financial contribution by a government conferring a benefit", which includes the direct
transfers of funds, goods or services (other than infrastructure) and the
non-collection or forgiveness of taxes otherwise due. Further, the SCM
Agreement distinguishes two categories of subsidies: prohibited subsidies
and actionable subsidies. The prohibited subsidies, described in article 3
of the SCM Agreement, are disallowed outright, and WTO members are
allowed to unilaterally impose countervailing measures against the country
sponsoring them. This category includes (i) subsidies that are contingent,

J~---MJ. Trebilcock, Understanding Trade Law (Edward Elgar 201 l).
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in law or in fact, upon export performance; and (ii) subsidies that are contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods.

remissions or exemptions that are created, for the purpose of avoiding double
taxation of foreign-source income.

On the other side of the spectrum, the actionable subsidies category includes
any other subsidies that are not considered "prohibited" and that satisfy the
following two additional requirements:
specificity: an actionable subsidy is considered specific when the eligi-

On the other side, tax benefits limited to duty drawback and/or indirect tax
exemption, remission or deferral systems for exports (e.g. VAT refunds)
are nonnally not considered subsidies under article I.I (and its footnote I),
except for the case of capital goods imported for trade or business. 19

bility to receive the benefits is limited to certain enterprises, industries
or areas (article 2 of the SCM Agreement); and
adverse effect: an actionable subsidy is considered adverse when it pro-

duces a serious prejudice to the interests of another member, an injury
to its domestic industry or a nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing directly or indirectly to other members under General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA'.IT) 1994 (article 5 of the SCM
Agreement).
When an actionable subsidy is specific and produces an adverse effec 4 the
affected countries are entitled to file a formal complaint with the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body and may impose retaliatory sanctions in the event
that the complaint is successful.
For the first 5 years after its entry into force, the SCM Agreement contained a third category of subsidies, i.e. the non-actionable subsidies. The
non-actionable subsidy provisions, as defined in articles 8 and 9 of the
SCM Agreemen4 were narrowly-defined specific subsidies for research
and developmen4 the adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental
regulations and assistance for disadvantaged regions. These subsidies were
selected for non-actionable status on the basis that they furthered important
policy goals and were unlikely to have harmful effects on trade. The provisions on non-actionable subsidies applied provisionally for a period of 5
years and expired at the end of 1999.
The SCM Agreement contains no specific rules concerning STZs. However,
an STZ scheme can be considered as conferring a prohibited or actionable
subsidy if certain requirements are satisfied. The first requirement is that the
tax benefit granted by the STZ must fall within the definition of a subsidy
provided by article I of the agreement In this respect, reductions, remissions or deferrals of direct taxes normally qualify as subsidies under the
agreement because they are treated as "financial contributions that result in a
benefit" (article l.l(a), appendix I, paragraph E). In an attempt to coordinate
this general rule with the double tax treaty network, footnote 59 of annex I
to the agreement introduces an exception for cases of direct tax reductions,

134

Once demonstrated that the tax preferences granted by the S1Zs are subsidies under article I of the SCM Agreemen4 the next step consists of determining whether those subsidies are considered prohibited, actionable or
non-actionable. For these purposes, this chapter distinguishes (i) "red-light
STZs", which are those that qualify as prohibited subsidies under article 3
of the SCM Agreement; (ii) "yellow-light STZs", which are those that
qualify as actionable subsidies under article 2 of the SCM Agreement; and
(iii) "green-light S1Zs;' which are those that are outside the purview of the
WTO.

7.2.2. Red-light STZ.5
Red-light STZs are prohibited under article 3 of the SCM Agreement. This
category includes STZs granting tax benefits that qualify as prohibited subsidies under the agreement. An STZ grants a prohibited subsidy when the
tax benefits are contingent upon export performance or the use of domestic
over imported goods. Specifically, annex I of the agreement provides a list
of the prohibited export subsidies, which includes (in paragraph E) income
tax reductions, remissions, deferrals and special exceptions, to the extent
that they are specifically related to exports. With regard to indirect taxes and
customs duties, an exemption, remission or deferral is considered a prohibited subsidy only if it is in excess of those levied with respect to the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.
The language of article 3 and the guidelines provided in annex I of the
agreement treat as a prohibited subsidy any ring-fencing scheme based on
prohibiting the introduction of goods manufactured within the STZ into
the domestic market of the sponsoring country. When an STZ qualifies as

~
Footnote I of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement
provides that "the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the
like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remissioo of such duties or
taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a
subsidy".
135
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a red-light S1Z, any WTO member may request the establishment of a
dispute settlement procedure in order to obtain a ruling recommending that
the offending subsidies must be withdrawn without delay. The requesting
member does not need to demonstrate that the subsidy is spe<:ific to a certain
industry or sector or that the subsidy is producing an adverse effect on the
economy of the other WTO member. Further, if the member found to be in
violation does not comply with the recommendation, the complaining party
may eventually receive authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to
take appropriate countermeasures.
The entry into force of the SCMAgreement was a hard blow for many countries, especially developing countries with long-established manufacturing
S1Zs treated as separate areas outside their borders or "national customs territory" and with tax benefits conditional on export performance. In the years
that followed the introduction of the agreemen 4 indeed, several developing

countries expressed concern that some of their internal tax and import duty
exemption programmes that would be covered by the prohibition were still
of crucial importance for achieving their development objectives. Besides,

developing countries argued that export subsidies are superior to tariffs to
protect their infant industries because the latter also negatively affect consumers in the domestic markets. 20
In response to these concerns, the SCM Agreement affords an exemption under article 27.2(a) and annex VII for less-<leveloped countries that
have not reached a GNP per capita of USD 1,000. For the purposes of this

exception, Annex VII of the agreement includes a list with all the countries
with per capita income below the USD 1,000 threshold. The lis4 created
during the Uruguay round, originally included 20 countries (e.g. Bolivia,
Cameroon, Kenya, Honduras and Pakistan), and none of the acceding countries were superadded afterwards (e.g. Vietnam)." Once countries reach
and establish a GNP per capita of USD 1,000, they are removed from the
exemption. As of today, countries such as the Dominican Republic, Egyp4
Guatemala, Morocco and the Philippines have been removed from the list.

In addition to this exemption, articles 27.2(b) and 27.4 affords, to all
developing countries not included on the lis4 an 8-year transition period

to eliminate incompatible subsidies. This transition period expired for all
countries at the end of 2002, but they are entitled to request an extension by
the SCM Committee in light of their development needs under article 27.4.
The SCM Committee annually reviewed the necessity thereof. If a negative
determination was made, the export subsidy had to be phased out within
2 years from the end of the last authorized period." Finally, the flexibility
to offer export subsidies for both groups of developing countries was extinguished for products that had reached export competitiveness. According
to article 27 .6, export competitiveness of a product exists "if a developing
country Member's exports of that product have reached a share of at least
3.25% in world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years".

This limitation excludes the main activities of all the large industria1ized
developing countries (e.g. Indian textiles) without regard to their economic
performance.
To summarize, since the SCM Agreement entered into force, the number
of red-light S1Zs around the globe has dropped, mainly after the end of the
last transition period. As of today, only a reduced number of small trading
developing countries maintain red-light S17s.

7 .2.3. Yellow-light STZs
Yellow-light S1Zs qualify as actionable subsidies under the SCM
AgreemenL The yellow-light category includes S1Zs granting benefits that

are actionable subsidies, that satisfy the specificity requirement of article 2
of the agreement and that satisfy the adverse effect requirement of article 6
of the agreemenL If these three requirements are satisfied, the affected
wro member is entitled to file a formal complaint with the wro Dispute
Settlement Body, with the possibility for the imposition of retaliatory sanctions in the event that the complaint is successful.

The tax benefits provided by an S1Z would normally satisfy the "specific-

20. Commission on Growth and Development. The Growth Repon: Strategies for
Sw.rtaln,d Growth and Inclusive Deve/opment(World Bank 2008), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/l0986/6507/449860PUB0Box3101OFFICIALOUSEOO
NLYl.pdf (accessed 27 Dec. 2017).
21.
D. Coppens. How Special is the Special and Diffenntial Tnatmult 1,1/Ullrthe SCM
Agreement? A l.Lgai and Nonnative Analysis oJWfO Subsidy Disciplines on Developing
Coun,ms, t 2 World Trade Review I, p. 79 (2013).
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ity" requirement because ring-fencing, by definition, is based on restricting
the tax benefits to a separate area, sector, group or enterprise in order to protect the domestic tax base. Based on this reasoning, an S1Z that excludes the
tax residents of the sponsoring country from the tax benefits would potentially qualify as an actionable and specific subsidy if the industry sector is
22.

Id.
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included within the scope of the SCM AgreemenL As explained before, the

non-harmful STZs: STZs with tax ~nefits that are actionable and specific subsidies but do not satisfy the "adverse effects" requiremenL This
category would include, for example, STZs in which the benefit does
not exceed the 5% threshold described in article 6 of the SCM
Agreement (see section 7.2.3.);

SCM agreement is limited in scope to trade in goods and excludes trade in

services.
Upon establishing specificity, the tax break must result in "adverse effects"
for another WID member. 1be SCM Agreement provides for three types of
adverse effects: (i) injury to a domestic industry; (ii) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other members under the
GATf 1994; or (iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another member.
Article 6 of the SCM Agreement provides complex rules to determine
whether an actionable subsidy produces a serious prejudice. A subsidy is
generally deemed to produce a serious prejudice under these rules if (i) the
total value of the subsidization represents more than 5% of the value of
the product or more than the amount of net operating losses sustained by
an industry (with the exception of one-time measures); or (ii) the subsidy
consists of a direct forgiveness of debt.
To summarize, the tax benefits granted by an STZ to a specific industry,
sector or taxpayer are, by definition, treated as specific subsidies under
the SCM Agreement 1berefore, it would be necessary to test whether the
"adverse effect" requirement of article 6 of the SCM Agreement is satisfied.
In this regard, for example, if the lower corporate income tax rate is found
to subsidize the production costs by 5% or more, the STZ would be deemed

to cause serious prejudice and adverse effects on the interests of other members. If that is the case, the STZ will be obliged to withdraw the subsidy or
remove its adverse effects. However, the sponsoring country could bring
the regime into conformity with the subsidy rules by only increasing the
low corporate income tax rate to the extent necessary or lowering the mainstream rate to match the level offered within the STZ. Alternatively, the
sponsoring country could remove the specificity of the STZ by opening up
the tax benefit to all industry sectors, both domestic and foreign. However,
this, in effect, may negate the purpose of the STZ. As a consequence, under
the "actionable subsidies" criteria, the legality of STZs is still very risky."

-

service-oriented STLs: subsidies promoting the provision or exportation of services;

-

STZs granting benefits protected by the Agreement on Agriculture; and
article 8 STZs (until 1999). While SCM article 8 was in effect (through
31 December 1999), STZs intended to promote certain research activities, assistance for disadvantaged regions or the adaptation of existing

facilities to new environmental requirements were not considered unfair
or distortive by the

wro. Since this provision was eliminated, the tax

policies underlying the subsidization are no longer relevant for the

wro legal analysis. The main factors to determine whether a subsidy
is permitted under the wro rules (specificity, adverse effects, etc.) are
fact-specific and do not rely on

tax

policy considerations.

Although unlikely, a green-light STZ could still be in violation of other
wro Agreements, such as the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade
on Services (GATS) or the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
Agreement.

An S1Z could contravene the non-discrimination principle established in
the GATT/GATS. This principle, which is one of the cornerstones of the

wro legal framework, is embodied in two obligations: the most-favourednation (MFN) treatment obligation and the national treatment obligation. In
simple terms. the MFN treatment obligation prohibits discrimination among
goods, services or service suppliers of different origins (or with different
foreign destinations)." 1be national treannent obligation, in turn, prohibits

discrimination between foreign goods, services and service suppliers and
domestic goods, services and service suppliers. 25
The most relevant non-discrimination provisions are included in articles I
and III of the GATT for the case of goods and in articles II and XVII of the
GATS for the case of services.

7.2.4. Green-light STZs
Green-light STZs are outside the scope of the wro Agreements. This category includes:

In the case of a goods-oriented STZs, articles I and III of the GATT would
apply if the STZ provides preferential treatment to certain companies based

24.P. van den Bossche & D, Prevost. &senua/s ofWTO law p. 13 (Cambridge University
23.

Press 2016).
25. Id.

Farrell, supra n. 4.
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on their nationality. This exposure is low because it is commonly accepted
that the non-discrimination rules of the GAIT only apply to trade tax and
internal indirect tax benefits and exclude income tax benefits." In this
regard, article III of the GAIT provides that "internal taxes ... should not
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production". The reference to "products" in article III suggests
that the GAIT only applies to indirect taxes. A systematic interpretation of
the agreement, however, shows a fair amount of ambiguity to the point that

the case of the GAIT are applicable to the GATS. To summarize, the overall
exposure of S1Zs to the GAIT/GATS non-discrimination provisions is low.

there are no final positions or conclusive answers to this issue. 27 However,

investment measures that are in violation of the agreement. The list includes

even if the GAIT were applicable to direct taxes, the "national treatment"
obligation is unlikely to pose significant challenges for an S1Z. This is first
because the national treatment obligation of the GAIT is intended to protect
foreign investors at a disadvantage with respect to the local investors but
does not work the other way around (protecting local investors from their
foreign competitors), and second because an income tax limited in scope to
foreign activities would be almost impossible to eoforce. 28
Service-oriented S1Zs, in tum, could potentially be restricted by articles II
and XVII of the GATS. This agreement, however, allows WfO members to
maintain specific exceptions to the application of the MFN provision (article 11:2)" and includes a general exception to the national treatment rule for
the case of measures implemented for the purpose of ensuring the "equitable
or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes" (article XIV (d)). 30
These two groups of exceptions narrow the potential applicability of the
GATS to service-oriented S1Zs. However, a service-oriented S1Z that provides preferential tax treatment to a subset of companies based on their
nationality could still be considered contrary to the MFN principle ( article II
of the GATS) to the extent that it is not protected by a specific exception."
With respect to the national treatment rule, the considerations provided for

Finally, an S1Z can fall within the scope of the TRIMS Agreement because
the typical tax incentives provided by these schemes would normally qualify

as a "trade-related investment measure."
The annex of the TRIMS Agreement provides an illustrative list of the

trade-related investment measures that (i) require "the purchase or use by

an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source"
(commonly called "local-content requirements"); (ii) require "that an

enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount
related to the volume or value of local products that it exports" ("tradebalancing requirements"); or (iii) "restricts the importation by an enterprise"

by "restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related

to

the

foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise" ("foreign exchange
restrictions"). As a result, any S1Z that has a local-content requirement, a

trade-balancing requirement or a foreign exchange restriction could be considered in violation of the TRIMS Agreement However, it should be noted
that the TRIMS Agreement only applies to investment measures related to
trade in goods, excluding services. In addition, the TRIMS Agreement is

focused on indirect taxes and customs duties rather than direct taxes. In this
respect, article II of the agreement states that the prohibitions are intended
to reinforce the obligation of national treatment (paragraph 4 of article III
of the GAIT) and the obligation of the general elimination of quantitative
restrictions (paragraph I of article XI of the GAIT). These obligations, as
explained, do not apply to direct taxes.

7-3. Inconsistencies in the current WTO regime
Id., at p. 31. See also M. Matsushita, T. Schoenbawn & P. Mavroidis, Th, World
Trcuk OrganizatWn.: law, Practice and Policy, 2nd edn., p. 168 (Oxford IntemationaJ
Law Library 2006): ..So-called direct taxes (i.e., those not imposed on products but on
income or producers) fall outside the scope of article III:2. Article In: 2 applies to taxes
only on products (e.g., sales taxes, excise taxes, value-added taxes)."
27.
Farrell, supra n. 4, at p. 79.
28. R. Avi-Yonah, Passpon to Tokdo: CUNO. the WTO and Ute ECJ, 109Tax Notes,
26.

7.3.1. Good intentions, but unfair outcomes
In the last 2 decades, the wro has become the global leader in the regulation of S1Zs. The rules of the SCM Agreement filled a regulatory vacuum
that the OECD left when its members decided to withdraw the organization

from any initiative intended to regulate

tax

incentives and countries' tax

pp. 1661-1668 (2005).

policies.

Currently, more than 400 measures have been ex.empt from the most-favourednatioo clause, and many of those exceptions include direct taxes.
30.
Farrell, supra n. 4, at p. 92.
31.
F.ngman et al., supra n. 3.

The shift of global leadership from the OECD to the WfO could be seen as
a positive change in terms of legitimacy because the WfO is a truly global
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organization with 164 members (as of 29 July 2016), representing 92% of
the world's population and 95% of world trade. In addition, this change
could be seen as legal p<ogress because the WTO can create "hard international law" enforced by quasi-judicial global institutions. 1be main benefit
of creating hard international law is the breakdown of the "Westphalian
dilemma" and all the collective action problems of the current international
tax regime.
Overall, however, the current WTO legal framework of STZs appears to be
unfair and inconsistent with the underlying policy goals of this organization.
This is because service STZs generally remain free from legal challenges
(because there are no formal subsidy rules concerning services), whereas
manufacturing STZs (with substantial activities) are significandy curtailed.
The disparity in treannent between goods-oriented STZs and service-oriented STZs has produced a negative impact on developing countries, as they
tend to rely more on manufacturing STZs to achieve economic growth. At
the same time, the disparity in legal treannent benefits developed countries,
which tend to rely more on offshore banking, technology and financial services STZs to attract investment.

1be current WTO system restricts developing countries from exploiting
their competitive advantages in the manufacturing of goods. At the same
time, the current system incentivizes developed countries to implement
STZs in areas where they have comparative advantages, such as financial
services, telecommunications and banking. 1be WTO records of requests
for consultations provide factual support of this conclusion: from a total of
115 cases based on the SCM Agreement, only 32 were initiated by developing countries." In addition, most of the export-<:ontingent STZs created in
the developing world were significandy restricted during the early 2000s by
the operation of the SCM Agreement 1be technical reason for this disparity
is that the SCM Agreement did not include services within its scope, and
the GATS has not included subsidy rules to fill that gap. As a result, international financial service zones or international business centres that offer
offshore banking are generally free from challenges under current WTO
law, although they could be challenged at the regional level (e.g. under EU
law). The fairness and distributional concerns raised by this disparity have
not been sufficiendy addressed by the WTO leadership, on the grounds that
the main objectives of the WTO are limited to marlcet access, freedom and
non-discrimination in trade.
32. World Trade Organization (WTO), Disputes by Agrum,nt, available at https://
www.wto.org/eoglishltratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20# (acoessed
V Feb. 2017).
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In sections 7.3.2.-7.3.4., this article will analyse three case studies that
demonstrate the disparity of treannent explained above: (i) 1be Costa Rica
Duty-Free regime; (ii) 1he US Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) regime
(and the Boeing case); and (iii) the portfolio participation exemption.

7.3.2. Case study 1: Manufacturing STZs in the developing
world: The Costa Rica Duty-Free Zone
Costa Rica's Duty-Free Zone regime, created by Law No. 7210 of
23 November 1990, is a set of incentives and benefits offered to enterprises
making new investments in Costa Rica The incentives granted by this
regime are as follows:
inward clearance into the duty-free zone of goods required for the operations of the enterprise, including supplies, accessories, machinery
and equipment, fuel and transportation;
exemption from all taxes relating to the exportation or re-exportation of
goods;
- exemption from payment of taxes on capital and net assets, payment of
land tax and payment of tax on the transfer of real estate;
exemption from sales and consumption taxes on purchases of goods and
services;
- exemption from
taxes on remittances abroad;
exemption from all taxes on profits and any other taxes for which the
tax base is calculated in relation to gross or net earnings, dividends paid
to shareholders or revenue or sales; and
- exemption from all municipal or business taxes.

an

At the time of its creation, the Duty-Free Zone was ring-fenced by requiring
that at least 75% of an enterprise's production was exported. This requirement was clearly intended to protect the domestic market from the subsidized goods manufactured in the STZ. 1he beneficiaries of the Duty-Free
Zone were export-processing industries, export-trading enterprises, service
industries and enterprises that export services to naturaJ or legal persons
domiciled abroad and enterprises or other entities engaged in scientific
research. Banking, financial and insurance entities based in duty-free zones
did not qualify for the benefits of this regime.

In 2010, Costa Rica reported 246 enterprises receiving the benefits of DutyFree Zone status, which represented 54.2% of Costa Rica's total exports
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and approximately 58,000 new jobs directly associated with the STZ. 33 In
addition, Costa Rica reported that the Duty-Free Zone had a favourable
socio-economic impac4 with the installation of high-technology enterprises
(including the famous settlement of Intel) and the development of a significant knowledge-based industry in the domestic marke 4 plus a specialized
and higbly competitive labour force.

lnconsistancies In the current WTO regime

and economically sustainable, both before and after the 2010 reform." As
of 2016, for every I tax dollar forgone, companies in the Costa Rican STZ
generated 6.2 dollars in value. In addition, the STZ generated, in 2015,
social security tax revenues in the amount of USD 515 million, 82,086 jobs
and average salaries 1.8 times higher than in the rest of the country.
During the last decade, many other countries have also trimmed down

However, since the SCM Agreement entered into force in 1995, the Costa
Rican Duty-Free Zone became a prohibited subsidy subject to the 8-year
transition period of article 27.4. In 2001, during the Doha negotiations, the
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the wro decided
that the transition period, ending in 2002, should be extended to the end
of 2007, subject to annual review." In 2007, the WIO again extended
the exemptions for 22 countries (including Costa Rica) for an additional 8
years (until 2015)." During the third transition period, Costa Rica implemented deep changes in the Duty-Free Zone in order to comply with the
provisions of the SCM Agreement The new tax regime, 36 as amended in
2010, incorporated a new category of processing enterprises that does not
require the exportation of a percentage of production in order to be eligible
for the Duty-Free Zone regime. The amendments to the law specify that the
exemptions and benefits applicable to enterprises classified under the new
article 17(0 of the law shall not be contingent in fact or in law upon export
performance. In addition, such enterprises are allowed to introduce their
production into the domestic market without losing the benefits, but in such
cases, all import taxes and customs procedures will apply.
Despite these profound reforms, the Costa Rican Duty-Free Zone continued

to produce a favourable socio-economic impact, and remained an attractive
hub for foreign investment In fac 4 a recent study issued by a Costa Rican
governmental agency (Promotora de Comen:io Exterior de Costa Rica, or
PROCOMER) indicates that the Duty-Free Zone has always been socially

incentives to permitted exemptions or have made such exemptions WTOconsistent by relaxing the export requirement Thus, the requirement that
all or a certain percentage of production must be exported, such as under
the old Costa Rican Duty-Free Zone regime, has become increasingly rare."
The success of the Costa Rican STZ experience, however, cannot be easily
replicated under the current WTO legal framework. In actuality, if a devel-

oping country wishes to pursue an export promotion policy, it will find that
most of the STZ schemes that countries such as Costa Rica, Korea (Rep.),
Panama or Taiwan utilized in the past to create export-led economic growth
are no longer allowed under the current WTO system."
The WTO restrictions on export-related subsidies have a significant impact

on big industriali:red developing countries with diversified local economies
(e.g. Argentina. Brazil, Colombia or Turkey). Indeed, if a big industrialized
developing country introduces an STZ without an export requirement, that
would likely result in the destruction of their incipient domestic industries
rather than the promotion of export-led economic growth. In addition, the
Costa Rican example demonstrates that countries can implement exportrelated subsidies for a transitional period and then repeal those restrictions
without losing the foreign investment and the associated export-related
growth.
Overall, this case study shows that the SCM Agreement has significantly
reduced the ability of developing countries to use export promotion poli-

cies to foster the manufacturing activities for which they have competitive
33. PROCOMER. Promotora de Comucio Exterior de Costa Rica. Balance de las
Zona.r Francas: B~ficio Neto ckl Rigimci para Costa Rica. 2006-2010 (PROCOMER

advantages.

2011).
34.
WTO, ProcllUl.~s for atfflJion.t IPUUr A.rtick 27.4 for certain developing country
membm para. l.(e) (WTO 2001).
35.
WTO, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Decision of the
Committee of 13 July 2007, G/SCM/120, appendix I (WTO 2007).
36. The draft was approved by the Legislative Assembly on 17 December 2009 and
signed by the Executive on 12 January 20!0. Accordingly, Law No. 8794of 12 January 20!0
(CR: Amendments to the Duty-Free Zooe Regime Law, No. 7210 of 23 November 1990)
came into effect on 22 January 20IO when it was published in the Official Journal La
Gaceta No. 15 of22 January 20IO.

TI.J>ROCOMER, Promotora del Comercio E.nerior de Costa Rica. Balanc~ t:h las
Znnas Francas: Ben.eficio Netodd RtgUMnpara Costa Rica 201 I-20/5 (PROCOMER
201 1), available at https-J/prooomer.com/downloads/zonas-francas/balance_zf_201 !_2015.
pdf (accessed 27 Dec. 2017).
38. Engman ct al., supra n. 3.
39. J. Mah, Special and Dijfemuial Tre~nr of Developing Countrie.s and Export
Promotion Policies under the WTO, 34 The World Economy 12 (2012).

144

145

Chapter 7 - Special Tax Zones and the Wond Trade Organization

7.3.3. Case study 2: Manufacturing STZs in the developed
world: The US DISC-FSC disputes
In I 972, the United States passed the Domestic Sales Corporation (DISC)
legislation as part of a raft of protectionist measures introduced to lessen a
persistent balance-of-payment deficit In addition, the DISC legislation was
created to balance the disadvantage that US companies face in comparison
with their counterparts in countries practicing territorial tax methods and
benefiting from "discriminatory" border tax adjustments. The DISC legislat,on created an onshore method of tax sheltering that allowed a US parent
com_pany to set up a wholly--0wned subsidiary for the purpose of deferring
US mcome taxation on profits arising from export activities. Typically, a
DISC was a "fictitious" company that operated as an export agent for the
parent. The tax break offered three advantages. First 50% of the DISC's
"export sales income" was sheltered from federal income tax until actual
distribution. Second, "inter-company" pricing rules enabled the parent company to channel more income to the DISC than would have normally been
the case under the Internal Revenue Code's standard arm's length pricing
method. 1hese rules resulted in up to a 25% indefinite tax deferral on the
parent's total combined income. Third, sheltered income could be shifted
back to the parent company in the form of producer loans, thus creating a
means of "bailing out" tax-deferred income.
In 1974, the European Community initiated an official complaint against the
DISC regime. The European Community argued that the DISC regime was
an export subsidy that fit in the list of subsidies provided by annex I, item
(c). The WID Panel found the DISC deferral to be a legal export subsidy in
violation of the GATT 1947, as it did not attract the interest component of
the tax that would normally be levied for late or deferred payment of tax.
The WIO Panel found that the forgiveness interest constituted a "partial
exemption" under both items (c) and (d) of the Illustrative List.
To bring the DISC regime in conformity with the wro resolution, the
United States enacted the FSC regime. FSCs remained functionally equivalent to their predecessors, the DISCs, but shifted the tax break to qualified offshore locations (e.g. Barbados and the US Vu-gin Islands). The FSC
corporate requirements were flexible enough for the US parent to maintain little more than a fictitious company. The FSC regime offered three
tax advantages. First the FSC obtained a corporate income tax exemption on a portion of "foreign trade income" (at least 30%) deemed to be
"foreign source income not effectively connected with a trade or business
within the United States". Second, the tax exemption circumvented the
146
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US controlled-foreign-corporation rules. (Internal Revenue Code Subpart
F income). Third, the distribution of dividends, whether deriving from the
exempt or non-exempt FSC income, normally qualified for a I00% deduction. Like the DISC, the tax break was magnified by the availability of
special transfer pricing methods.
Technically, the FSC regime is clearly a ring-fenced preferential tax regime.
The restriction of the benefits for the so-called "foreign trade income" isolates the domestic market from the activities of the beneficiaries. In addition,
the tax break is an export subsidy under article 3 of the SCM Agreement
In 1999, the WIO Panel found that the FSC regime constituted a prohibited subsidy pursuant to article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement. In 2000, the
Appellate Body report upheld the Panel's ruling.
To summarize, the WIO has clearly identified both the DISC and FSC
regimes as red-light STZs. This case study shows that the restrictions
imposed by the wro on STZs have impacted developed countries as well.
However, the difference in this scenario is that developed countries generally have competitive and long-established industries that are generally not
impacted by competing foreign investment once the export requirements
are removed.

7.3.4. Case study 3: Service/financial STZs in the developed
world: The interest portfolio exemption
In 1984, Congress repealed the US withholding tax on portfolio interest
income earned by foreigners.'° "Portfolio interest" was defined as including interest on US government bonds, on bonds issued by US corporations
(unless the bondholder held I 0% or more of the shares of the corporation)
and on US bank accounts and certificates of deposit. In the short run, the
portfolio interest exemption was motivated by the immediate desire of both
the US government and US multinationals to borrow abroad without having to bear the cost of any withholding tax. In the long run, however, other
policy arguments were weighed. The reform was intended to bring back to
the United States some of the financing activity that shifted to London in
the 1970s and 1980s and recapture the related employment and tax receipts
from this sector of the economy. 41 Indeed. an estimate discussed in the con40.
US: Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494,
648-50 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 87 l(h) (1994)).
41.
US: 1983-84 Misc. Tax Bills VI: S. 1066, S. 1550, S. 1557 and S. 1666: Joint Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Savings, Pension. & lnvestment Policy and Subcommittee
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gressional debates forecasted the creation of 250,000 new jobs as a result

of the tax reform. "'2
The United States' enactment of the portfolio interest exemption has
resulted in a classic race to the bouom because most developed countries
followed the United States and eliminated their withholding tax on interest
paid to non-residents on bank deposits and on government and corporate
bonds to protect their banking and financial activities." In addition, some
developed countries went further and included exemptions of dividend payments limited to non-residents (e.g. the Netherlands).
From a technical perspective, the portfolio interest exemption is a preferential tax regime because its beneficiaries do not have to pay taxes for the
receipt of interest that qualifies as "portfolio." In addition, this preferential
tax regime is ring-fenced because the tax residents of the sponsoring counlly are excluded from the tax benefits offered by the regime. For example,
in the case of the United States, the tax residents must include the portfolio
interest received in their gross income and pay taxes accordingly, while
the non-residents (with no trade or business in the United States) are not
required to pay any income tax on this type of interest

the capital Hight from all developing c9untries to the United States in the
1980s reached as high as USD 148 billion in a single year.« In this regard,
the domestic economy of the sponsoring counlly is not affected by the tax

break because the benefits are ring-fenced to non-residents. However, as
explained, the SCM Agreement does not impose limitations on this practice

because it is not oriented towards promoting trade in goods.
This situation unveils a clear disparity in treatment between developed and
developing countries. Developed countries have had leeway to use. ring-

fenced schemes as a tool to perpetuate their competitive advantages m the
field of banking and financial activities and to enlarge the development gap
with developing countries. This form of tax competition, tolerated by the
OECD and the WTO, has fueled the process of capital flight in developing

countries, destroyed their currencies and weakened their sovereignty.

7.4. EU State aid rules and STZs
7.4.1. Overview of the EU State aid rules
The European Union has also developed a legal framework for state-

If the SCM Agreement were applicable to services, the portfolio interest

provided tax incentives, including STZs. These rules, genera~ly known_ as

exemption could be considered a yellow-light STZ regime because the subsidy is specifically oriented towards a service sector (banking and financing
activities). From a technical standpoint, the subsidy benefits the foreign
creditor and not the bank of the sponsoring country because the former is
the technical taxpayer of the withholding tax. From an economic perspective, however, the subsidies benefit the banks, which increase their international competitiveness (due to the reduction of the borrowing cost) and
attract more portfolio invesunent from other countries. Finally, these subsidies produce a serious prejudice to other WTO members. Latin American
countries provide a prime example: after the enactment of the portfolio
interest exemption, about USD 300 billion fled from Latin American countries to bank accounts and other forms of portfolio invesunent in the United
States. Most of these funds were channeled through tax haven corporations
and therefore escaped taxation in the country of residence. Estimates of

"State aid rules," differ from the WTO rules with respect to their underlying

goals, enforcement procedures and scope.
With respect to the underlying goals, the WTO's foundational principles are
market access, non-discrimination and fairness in trade. These policy goals,
embedded in the WTO legal framework, are primarily related to the opera-

tion of the private economy•' and generally do not address, at least directly,
pathologies affecting the public economy, such as harmful tax competition, base erosion or profit shifting. In contrast, the EU legal framework ts
grounded on much further-reaching policy objectives such as, inter alia, the

creation of an internal integrated market and even a pohttcal umon among
the EU Member States." In that respect, the EU rules on State aid have
been systematically used since the late 1990s as an instrument to tackle

on Taxation & Debt Management of the Senate Committee on Finance, 98th. Cong., Ist
Sess. 30-3 I (1983), p. 244 (statemeot of John Evans of Morgan Stanley & Co.).
42. M. Doskey Franson, Repeat of the Thirty Percmt Withholding Tax on Portfolio
/,iurest Paid to Foreign Jrwestors,6 Nw J. lnt'I L. & Bus., p. 930 (1984-1985).
43. R. Avi• Yooah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and tM Fucai Crisis of the We-lfcZrt'
State, 113 Harv. L Rev. 7, pp. 1573-1676 (2000).

44. Id.
45. C. Micheau. Stal~ Aid, Subsidy and Tax Jnceniivts under EU and \ITO I.Aw (Wolters
Kluwers 2014).
..
46. MM. Slod,oom, S,d,sidus;,, \ITO law and;,, EC law: Broad and Narrow 0.jillitwns,
36 Journal of World Trade 3, pp. 517-542 (2002).
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harmful tax competitio~ within, the European Union, 47 on the assumption

that harmful tax compeuuon 1s mcompatible with the internal market"'

EU State aid rules and S1Zs

by favoring certain undertakings or the {>rod.uction of certain goods shall, in so
far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal

mart.et.
With respect to the general content, the W10 system includes subsidies that
are forbidden in any case (red-light subsidies), subsidies that are forbidden
only if they result in measurable adverse effects (yellow-light subsidies)
and other subsidies that are allowed (green-light subsidies). These rules are
not applicable in the field of services. 1be State aid rules, on the contrary,
apply to any type of business, including services, and were designed as a
bipolar legal system in which the government aid is treated as either compatible or incompatible with the internal market. 1bere is not a third category subject to different requirements like in the W10 system. However,
the hoe between compatible and incompatible aid is more blurred in the EU
system than in the W10 system because certain State aid could be subject
to a d1screUonary assessment and considered compatible by the European
Comm1ss1on (e.g. situations involving the development of economically
depressed areas and certain economic activities).
Before assessing the specific application of the State aid rules to STZs it
is useful to outline, in a brief summary. the main features of the State ~id
legal framework as reflected in EU law, Commission pronouncements" and
court decisions.

7.4.2. Incompatible State aid
1be Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union'° (TFEU) defines
State aid in article 107(1), which reads:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distort competition
47.
Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council First
annual report on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on BusiDeSS Taxatidn and
fisc.aJ State aid - Progress report on the work concerning the taxation of income from
savmgs and a common system of taxation for interest and royalty payments between associat<d ccroparues, COM (I 998) 595 final (25 Nov, 1998).
48. Commission Communication, Towards tax co-ordination in the European Union _
A package to tackk harmful tax comp,tWon, COM (97) 495 final (1 Nov. 1997). Su also
Resolution of the Council and the rep-esentatives of the Governments of the Member
S ~ meeting with the Council of I Do::ember 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business
Taxatioo, OJ C2/6.
~9. . The Commission issued in 2016 a Notice on the notion of State Aid as referred to
m Article 107(1) TFEU, C/201612946, OJ C 262, 19 Jul. 2016.
50. . C~nsolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
FunctJonmg of the European Union, OJ C 326 (2012).

Based on this definition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)
has held that State aid exists when a national measure (i) is financed by the
state through state resources; (ii) provides an advantage for an undertaking; (iii) is selective; and (iv) affects trade between Member States and is
incompatible with the internal markeL 31
The definition provided by article 107(1) and its reference to "any aid
granted by a member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever" clearly supports the idea that a direct or indirect tax incentive granted
by a Member State would constitute State aid if it results in a selective
advantage that is incompatible with the internal market Under EU law, a
tax incentive includes an advantage in the calculation of the tax base, applicable tax rate, assessment of the tax liability or enforcement of a tax claim.
In recent investigations, the European Commission also included transfer
pricing rulings in contradiction with the arm's length principle. 32
The tax incentive must provide a selective advantage. This requirement is
satisfied when the tax burden of certain undertakings is reduced with respect
to the normal tax regime generally imposed by the Member State, which is
intended to be the general framework within which the effects of a measure
are to be analysed." For the purpose of this analysis, the EU courts have
elaborated the following three-step test:
step I: identification of the system of reference;
step 2: assessment of whether the measure at issue constitutes a derogation from the identified system in that it differentiates between economic operators that are, in the context of the economic system in question, in a comparable situation (derogation test); and
- step 3: evaluation of the possible justification of the measure by the
nature of the general scheme of the system itself (justification test).
Based on this three-step test, the ECJ's case law and the Commission's
practice have outlined different types of tax selectivity. For example, tax

~ E : ECJ, 15 June 2006, Joined Cases C-393/04 and C-41/05, Air liquid Jndustr~s
Belgiwn SA v. Vde de &raing a.o.
52.
N. Robins & S. Shamsi, Thi!: European Commission's Stall Aid Clampdown: Thi!:
&d of "Selective" Tax Rulings?, 18 Derivs. and Fin. lnstrums. I (2016), Journals IBFD.
53. R. Cisotta, Criterion of &kctivity, in State Aid law of tM European Union p. 133
(H. Hofmann & C. Micheau eds., Oxford U. Press 2016).
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selectivity can be based on the taxpayer's structure (e.g. considering its
size, public or private status or legal entity form) or on its activities (e.g.
tax benefits for textile activities or car manufacturers). It can also be based
on national criteria (e.g. tax benefits on national products), on a territorial
basis (e.g. tax benefits limited to a certain territory) or on other factors
(e.g. employment considerations or environmental or economic impact).
The Commission has also considered certain tax benefits as de facto selective when the measure was formally available for all the taxpayers bu 4 in
practice, only benefitted certain specific companies or businesses.
Finally, a selective tax incentive would constitute State aid if it is deemed
incompatible with the internal market The EO case law generally does not
require an actual analysis of these criteria, 54 and there is no indication that
the distortion of competition has to be significant or substantial." In that
respec4 it seems that the Commission and the EO generally presume that
this requirement is satisfied when the other conditions are met.

7.4.3. Compatible State aid
The general concept of State aid provided by article 107(1) recognizes several exceptions under article 107(2) and (3) of the 1FEU.
Under article 107(2) of the 1FEU, the following types of aid are regarded
as being compatible with the internal market
- aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided
that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of
the products concerned (article 107(2)(a));
- aid to compensate for damage caused by natural disasters or excep-tional occurrences (article 107(2)(b)); and
aid granted to the economy of certain areas of Germany affected by the
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division.

conservation and other categories specified by the decision of the Council in
a proposal from the Commission. A tax incentive found to constitute illegal
State aid would automatically be abolished or altered, and the European
Commission can recover the aid from the taxpayer, together with interest.
over a period of up to 10 years.

7.4.4. State aid and STZs
The tax benefits provided by STZs generally qualify under the definition of State aid provided by article 107(1) of the 1FEU. Moreover, the
Commission and the European courts have considered that a tax incentive
is selective in nature when the state ring-fences the benefit on a geographical or sectoral basis. In its 2016 Notice," the Commission stated that any
measure of which the scope does not extend to the entire tenitory of the
state should be considered selective. In the Azores decision, however, the
EO clarified this interpretation for the case of a tax incentive provided by
a regional or local government." In this regard, the Court acknowledged
that an intra-state entity can enjoy sufficiently autonomous status so that
the territory of the intra-state entity may be the relevant framework for
assessing the selectivity of the measure.~ The Court also stated that an
intra-state entity is deemed to have sufficient autonomous status when (i) it
has political and administrative status separate from the central government;
(ii) the financial repercussion of the tax incentive is not compensated by the
central governmen~ and (iii) the measure can be adopted without the central
government having the ability to interfere with its substance.

Besides aid that is de jure consistent with the internal market, certain State
aid could be subject to discretionary assessment and considered compatible by the Commission in situations involving the development of economically depressed areas, certain economic activities, cultural and heritage

Based on the aforementioned interpretations, SlZs appear to be incom•
patible with the internal marlc:et by nature. This conclusion, however, can
certainly be questionable when the exceptions provided for in article 107(2)
and 107(3) of the 1FEU are included in the equation. Indeed, the State aid
rules provide that a selective tax incentive can still be considered compat•
ible with the internal market if the policy objective of such an incentive falls
within the specific categories of article 107(2). Under article 107(2), the
following aid is considered compatible with the internal market: (i) aid with
a social character that is granted to individual consumers; (ii) aid granted
in case of damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;
and (iii) aid granted to the economy of certain areas affected by the division

54.
IT: Court of Frrst Instance), 4 Apr. 2001, Case T-288/97, Regione Frudi Venezia
Giatia v. CommissWn of the European Communities.
55. BE: EO, 21 Mar. 1990, Case C-142/87, Kmgdom of &lgium v. Commisswn of
CM European Communities.

~mmission Notice on the notion of State Aid. supra n. 49.
57.
PT: Grand Chamber, 6 Sepl 2006, Case C-88/03, Pom,gu,s, R,public v. Commission
of the Euro~an Commwtities, Action for annulment - State aid deciskin 2003/442/EC·.
58. Micheau, supra n. 41.
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of Germany. In addition, under article 107(3), the Commission has discretion to consider whether the following aid is compatible with the internal
market: (i) regional aid; (ii) aid promoting an important project of common
European interest; (iii) aid granted to remedy a serious economic disturbance; and (iv) aid supporting culture and heritage conservation.

In addition, when the State aid fits within any of the categories of article 107(3), the European Commission has exclusive competence to declare
such State aid as compatible with the internal market. With respect to
regional aid, the Commission has laid down a comprehensive set of guidelines describing specific regions where State aid would be judged as "good
aid." In general, these are the regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment. The guidelines also
describe the type of aid that is admitted and the type of investments that
are eligible.

considerably reduced rates for income ~nd withholding taxes on revenue
generated within the zone. All of these regimes have been subject to the
scrutiny of EU State aid rules and deemed permissible within the meaning of regional development aid. The Commission determined that the tax
incentives granted by the MFZ constitutes State aid within the meaning of
article I 07( I) of the 1FEU. The Commission relied on the fact that the aid
granted by the MFZ is directed towards an outermost region and is intended
to offset the additional costs arising in the economy of Madeira as a result
of its remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate,
economic dependence of a few products, etc. Based on those policy goals,
the Commission found the scheme to be compatible with the internal market pursuant to article 107(3Xa), as it was targeted to address the specific
handicaps of Madeira, as an outermost region, and was proportional, since

its conditions had the result of it not leading to overcompensation of the
additional costs of the aid beneficiaries.

In summary, the application of the EU State aid rules may require additional
judgement on the policy reasons underlying the creation of an S1Z. This
additional judgement results in certain STZs being treated as good aid and
others being treated as incompatible aid. For example, the Shannon S1Z in
Ireland was rejected for State aid approval and is no longer eligible under
the regional aid exceptions. Since 2003, the Shannon S1Z has been exposed
to Ireland's mainstream corporate tax rate of 12.5%. On the other hand, the
Madeira Pree Zone (MPZ) in Portugal has been respected and considered
good aid by the European Commission under article 107(3) of the 1FEU.
The MFZ was created in Portugal on the island of Madeira and currently

Decisions such as those regarding the MFZ demonstrate that the EU legal
framework provides a degree of flexibility that is not present in the WTO
system, which does not consider the objectives and policies pursued by
the states when they create an S1Z. On the flipside, the inclusion of policy
considerations in the equation raises a higher level of legal uncertainty that
generally is not present in the WTO legal framework.

operates an ind.ustriaJ free zone, an international services centre, an inter-

Since the SCM Agreement was enacted in 1995, global leadership in the
field of STZs has shifted from the OECD to the wro. The general WIO
Agreement includes a broad set of policy goals that goes beyond trade relationships, but its legal framework has been systematically narrowed down

national shipping registry and, beginning in 2015, an air transport register.
The current MFZ is the third subsequent aid scheme implemented by
Portugal and approved by the Commission in the exercise of the discretionary powers granted by article I 07(3). The first regime was authorized in
1987, and companies were able to benefit from it until 31 December 2011."
The second regime was authorized by the Commission in 2002, with the
same end date as the first. Starting on I January 2012, the companies registered under the second regime can only benefit from the provisions of
the third regime.'° The third regime, which is the current regime, offers
59.
Commission decisioo SG(87) 0/6736 of 27 May 1987 in Case N 204/86, prolonged
by Commission decision S0(92) D/1118 of 27 January 1992 in Case 613/91 and again

7.5. Conclusion

to the task of assuring market access, non-discrimination and fairness in
trade. Other relevant issues that impact trade, such as harmful tax competition or tax base erosion, have been treated as secondary agenda items and

are insufficiently weighted.
As of today, more than 20 years since the enactment of the first WIO
Agreements, the WTO's overall treatment of STZs appears to be inconsistent with the general policy goals of the organization. While service-oriented
STZs generally remain free from challenges because there are no_ formal

subsidy rules concerning services, manufacturing-oriented STZs with sub-

prolonged by Commission decision SG(95) D/1287 of 3 Novembc:£ 1995.
60. Bras et al, TM Mathira Free 'Zone and Its SlandpoinJ within the Euro~an Uni.on,
13 EC Tax Review 3, p. 124 (2004).

stantial activities have been significantly curtailed by the SCM Agreement.
The disparity in the treatment of goods and services has produced a negative
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impact on developing countries, as they tend to rely more on manufacturing STZs to achieve economic growth, while it has benefitted developed
countries, which rely more on offshore banking, technology and financial
service S'IZs in order to attract investmenL
The fairness and distributional concerns raised by this disparity in treatment
have also been overlooked, on the ground that the objectives of the wro
are limited to market access, freedom and non-discrimination in trade. This
perspective, however, is inconsistent with the rationale and general policy
goals of the organization, as provided by the main wro Agreement The
wro would do well to examine its differential treatment of service versus
manufacturing STZs in light of this disparate treatment of regimes in developing versus developed countries.
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Are the Special Tax Zone Policies Effective?
Evidence from China's Economic and
Technological Development Zones
Li Du*

8. L Introduction
8.1.1. The relevance of effectiveness of special tax zone
policies in the post-BEPS era
Special tax zone (STZ) policies mean the special tax policies that are
granted in some specified zones within one country. Typically, these policies may include lower tax rates, higher tax allowances or more generous
tax holidays when detennining the income tax liability of the taxpayers
located in those zones.
As is well known in the circle of tax scholars, the G20 countries and OECD
have been very aggressive in promoting reform of the intemationa1 tax system in recent years. In particular, great pressure has been put on harmful
tax competition.' In the report Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS), released by OECD,2 the availability of harmful preferential regimes
was listed in the main pressure areas that lead to BEPS. Not surprisingly,
"counter[ing] harmful tax practices more effectively, taking in account fac-

tors such as transparency and substance"3 was announced as one of the
actions to address the BEPS problem.
However, the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting mentioned that "[i]t will take a holistic approach to evaluate preferential tax
regimes in the BEPS context It will engage with non-OECD members on
the basis of the existing framework and consider revisions or additions to the
existing framework" (Action 5).' This indicates the importance of evaluat-

•
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2.
3.
4.
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